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USE OF "PRIMARY DUTY" DOCTRINE TO FRUSTRATE
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE FOR RAILWAY WORKERS
AND SEAMEN*
CONTRIBUTORY negligence of a plaintiff normally bars him from recovery
in a personal injury action.1 But the Federal Employers' Liability Act of
1908 2 changed this rule in cases involving interstate railway workers. And
the Jones Act of 1920 3 made the FELA provisions applicable to seamen. When
both plaintiff and defendant are at fault, the plaintiff's damages are proportion-
ately reduced on a theory of comparative negligence.4
After the abolition of contributory negligence as an absolute defense, how-
ever, other doctrines were employed to bar recovery by railway workers and
seamen. Courts reached the same result on a theory of assumption of risk-
a defense not eliminated by the FELA.0 In addition, the judicial mind
fashioned an entirely new exception to the comparative negligence doctrine:
when an employee disregarded a statute, express order, or standing com-
pany rule, and such disregard was a contributing cause of an injury that
could not have happened had the employee been obedient, he w.-as barred
from recovery against his master even though there was negligence on the
part of fellow servants.0 Such a plaintiff was deemed bound by a "primary
*Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952).
1. E.g., fehr v. G.C. Murphy Co., 60 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Moore v.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Works, 183 N.C. 438, 111 S.E. 776 (192); Holmes v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 207 Mo. 149, 105 SAV. 624 (1907). See Prossr, Torns § 52 (1941) ; Bohlen,
Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233 (1903).
2. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1946).
3. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946).
4. "iT]he fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence
shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to such employee." 35 STAT. 66 (1903), 45 U.S.C.
§53 (1946).
5. Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914) ; Jacobs v. Southern Ry.,
241 U.S. 229 (1916). See Buford, Assumnption of Risk Under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 28 HA-v. L. REv. 163 (1914) ; Peterson, The Jol:or in the Fcderal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 80 CENT. L.J. 5 (1915). See also 2 RoaErrs, FEmmAL Lmnmu.rrxs
OF CAaums § 825 et seq. (2d ed. 1929).
The common-law doctrine of assumption of risk in the master and servant field holds
that an employee assumes the ordinary risks of his employment and known, appreciated
risks created by the negligence of his master. Boatman v. Miles, 27 Wyo. 431, 199 Par.
933 (1921) ; Duffey v. Consolidated Block Coal Co., 147 Iova -25, 124 N . 609 (1910).
See 3 LABArr, COMMENTARIES ON THE Lw OF MASTER AND SEnVANT § 11862 (2d ed.
1913) ; James, Assmnption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 155 n.84 (1952). The doctrine was
developed by the common-law courts to shield employers from the burden of "human
overhead" inevitable in industry. See Tiller v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 53-9 (1943).
6. Frese v. Chicago. B. & Q.R.R., 263 U.S. 1 (1923) (right-of-way statute); Bradley
v. Northwestern Pac. R.R., 44 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1930) (passing order); Van Derveer
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duty" since the duty of an employee to obey statutes and company rules was
thought greater than the duty of the employer, through his servants, to
exercise due care.7 In some cases the exemption appeared nakedly as judicial
legislation s but others based it on a tortured rationale of proximate cause,0
or applied it under cloak of assumption of risk theory.10
In response to the pressure of the railway and maritime unions, Congress
in 1939 amended the FELA, specifically eliminating assumption of risk as a
defense."1 The Supreme Court suggested in dicta that Congress had intended
that the "primary duty" cases also be "swept into discard" by the amend-
ment.12 Although some courts thereafter accepted this view and treated
those cases as no longer controlling,'" a greater number appear to have un-
v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 84 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 595 (1936) (com-
pany switching rule). But cf. Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 288 U.S. 275 (1933) ; Union
Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918). See also Notes, 33 CoL L. REV. 372 (1933);
33 IowA L. REV. 165 (1947) ; 21 MINN. L. REV. 110 (1936); 26 TEXAS L. REV. 99 (1947).
7. E.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Wiles, 240 U.S. 444 (1916); Van Derveer v. Dela-
ware, L. & W.R.R., 84 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 595 (1936); Paster v.
Penna. R.R., 43 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1930). The logical structure of the doctrine, however,
was warped by the policy of employer protection. Thus, where two employees broke the
same rule, and the negligence of each contributed to the injury of the other, the negli-
gence of either was "primary" when he was a plaintiff and secondary when he was not.
Compare Unadilla Valley Ry. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139 (1928), with Unadilla Valley Ry.
v. Dibble, 31 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 565 (1929).
Prior to the advent of the "primary duty" doctrine, disregard of a company rule was
termed contributory negligence. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Niebel, 214 F. 952 (6th
Cir. 1914) ; Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Elliott, 137 F. 904 (2d Cir. 1905), appeal froim reinand,
161 F. 250 (2d Cir. 1908); Oberlin v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & N. Co., 71 Ore. 177,
142 Pac. 554 (1914). See also 2 RoBERTs, FamiPiAL LiABLTiES oF CAmuERs § 835 (2d. ed,
1929).
8. E.g., Unadilla Valley Ry. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139 (1928) ; Frese v. Chicago, B.
& Q.R.R., 263 U.S. 1 (1923) ; Van Derveer v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 84 F.2d 979 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 595 (1936).
9. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S. 313 (1932); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Davis, 75 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1935).
10. E.g., Darden v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 71 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.), ccrt. denied,
293 U.S. 597 (1934) ; McCarty v. Louisville & N. Ry., 202 Ky. 460, 260 S.W. 6 (1924).
Justice Black thought the "primary duty" doctrine was contributory negligence mas-
querading as assumption of risk. Tiller v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 63 (1943).
11. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1946), Tiller v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 318
U.S. 54 (1943). See Hearings before Subcommittee of Cominittee on Judiciary on S.
1708, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). See also Notes, 43 COL. L. REV. 527 (1943) ; 53 H/dv.
L. REv. 341 (1939).
12. Tiller v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., supra note 11, at 64. See Hearings, rupra note 11,
at 80-1.
13. Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 160 F.2d 654 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
763 (1947) ; Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. of Tex. v. Webb, 229 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) ; Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Mangum, 250 Ala. 431, 34 So.2d 848 (1948) ; Lect v. Union
Pac. R.R., 60 Cal. App. 2d 814, 142 P.2d 37 (1943).
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justifiably retained the "primary duty" rule as an independent absolute de-
fense to FELA recovery.' 4
The recent case of Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.'0 demonstrates the
persisting force of the "primary duty" rule as an independent exception to
the FELA comparative negligence provisions. Plaintiff brought an action
to recover damages for personal injuries suffered while serving as captain
of defendant's ship.-" He had been struck on the shin by a filing cabinet
drawer dislodged by the roll of the sea. Plaintiff asserted defendant was
negligent in the failure of other employees, including shore agents, to repair
defective catches on the cabinet.17 Defendant countered that the plaintiff-
captain had failed in his duty to keep the vessel in repair, since he had not
seen that his own orders to repair the cabinet were carried out. The trial
court instructed the jury that if they found both parties negligent they should
weigh the comparative negligence of each pursuant to the FELA and appor-
tion damages accordingly. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, but on
appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Although no
specific and limited company rule or order had been involved, the court,
of its own initiative, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, relied exclusively
upon the "primary duty" cases.' 8 The court held that the trial court's charge
to the jury had inadequately stated the extent of the captain's duty to keep
his ship in repair and to see that his orders were carried out.10 And the
captain's breach of this duty was not "contributory negligence" but "a bar
to any recovery."2 0
Even if the assumption be made that Congress never acted to discard the
"primary duty" doctrine,21 application of the rule in the Walkcr case would
14. E.g., Chicago, St. P., M. & O.R.R. v. Arnold, 160 F2d 1002 (Sth Cir. 1947);
Kum v. Reese, 192 Old. 78, 133 P.2d 88 (1943) ; Helton v. Thomson, 311 Ill. App. 354,
36 N.E.2d 267 (1941); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Guy, 203 Ark. 166, 157 S.2d 11 (1941).
15. 193 F2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952).
16. A ship's master is a "seaman!' within the operation of the Jones Act. Warner v.
Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934) ; Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., [1951] Am. Mar. Cas.
1004. See 1 Nomis, THE LAw or Sz.aix §6 (1951).
17. This was not an attempt by a worker, alone employed to maintain a safe work-
ing place, to impute his own negligence to his employer on the ground that the latter
had failed to provide him with a safe place to work. See Broderick v. St. Paul City Ry.,
74 Minn. 163, 77 N.W. 28 (1898).
18. Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772, 773-4 (2d Cir. 1952). The "primary
duty" doctrine was not argued in the briefs. All save one of the cases relied upon by the court
antedated the assumption-of-risk amendment to the FELA. And in the single post-1939 case
the question of defendant's liability had been allowed to go to the jury. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Ballard, 108 F.2d 76S (5th Cir. 1940). Judge Hand apparently disregarded a recent
case in the Second Circuit where, upon strikingly similar facts, the court applied the FELA
provisions without mention of the "primary duty" rule. Becker v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
179 F2d 713 (2d Cir. 1950).
19. Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 1952).
20. Id. at 773.
21. See p. 112 supra.
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be unwarranted. In all previous decisions the employer was immunized from
liability by a worker's breach of an express rule directed to a specific con-
tingency-a duty clear, limited, and easy of execution.2 2 But the Walkcr
opinion extends this protection to circumstances where the employee merely
breached a broad cautionary injunction covering myriad details of a complex
enterprise.
The Walker decision, however, may represent more than simple reliance
upon an old doctrine. It appears to create a new but more restricted exception
to the FELA rule of comparative negligence. In the past, courts assumed
that an employee's "primary duty" included obedience to rules directed solely
to his own safety.23 But the Walker opinion appears to differentiate between
"momentary inattention to one's own safety" and "breach of a duty assumed.,.
for the protection of others."24 The former is mere "contributory negligence"
calling for reduced damages; the latter alone will evoke the "primary duty"
rule to bar recovery completely. Thus "primary duty" is limited to a con-
cept of a higher duty imposed only where the safety of third persons is in-
volved.
To the extent that such a distinction between the nature of duties is as-
certainable, this reading of the Walker opinion will make possible recovery
by workers whose negligence amounts merely to disregard of a rule going
to their own safety. No longer will the promulgation by railroads and ship lines
of innumerable personal safety rules render the "primary duty" doctrine ap-
plicable to virtually all workers. 26  On the other hand, the opinion may bar
22. See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Wiles, 240 U.S. 444, 448 (1916). Judge Learned
Hand himself took the lead in restricting the application of the "primary duty" doctrine
to cases where a specific, rather than a broadly cautionary, rule was involved. "[The
'primary duty' doctrine] does not seem to us to extend to rules generally enjoining caution
or responsibility.... If it did, an employer could revive the defense of contributory negli-
gence by imposing as an affirmative duty such caution as is appropriate to the situation,
[The FELA] was designed to end that defense and cannot be so conveniently avoided.
." L. Hand, C.J., in Miller v. Central R.R. of N.J., 58 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1932).
See also Gildner v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 90 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Norfolk & W. Ry.
v. Riggs, 98 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1938) ; Kansas City So. Ry. v. Larsen, 195 Ark. 808, 114
S.W.2d 1081 (1938).
23. See, e.g., Paster v. Penna. R.R., 43 F.2d 908, 910 (2d Cir. 1930).
24. Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772, 774 (2d Cir. 1952). Judge Learned
Hand had previously implied disapproval of the "primary duty" doctrine as applied where
a personal safety rule was involved. Paster v. Penna. R.R., mtpra note 23, at 910. In
such cases it is often grossly unfair. To speed up operations, railroad officials themselves
frequently encourage disregard of safety rules. See communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Solomon Sachs, Legal Aid Department, Switchmen's Union of North
America, dated September 4, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
25. Each railroad generally issues from eight hundred to one thousand operating
rules, supplemented by numerous bulletins and special rules. See communication to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL, supra note 24.
Few trainmen's and seamen's work injury cases are litigated; the majority are settled
through a quasi-bargaining process. See RAmROAD RRTIRMMENT BoARD, WoRu INjuiuEs
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from legitimate recovery a large group of employees on many levels whose
duties include responsibility for the safety of others. Under modem condi-
tions, such employees must often delegate details of their general duty.- '
The instant rule indicates that they must do this at their peril: they cannot
recover for any negligent act done within the area of such responsibility.
Whether the judicially-created "primary duty" exception to the FELA be
viewed as either reiterated or modified by the Walker opinion, it should be
abandoned in its entirety. The only justification for the rule is the promotion
of strict attention to duty on the part of employees.2 7 In reality, however,
such a rule of law rarely has disciplinary effect; fear of injury is the real
task-master.28 Moreover, a total bar to FELA recovery is an unjustifiably
severe punishment corrupting legislative intent.29 Congress has twice acted
to make controlling the rule of comparative negligence. Lodged with the
courts is the duty to effectuate, not frustrate, this legislative command.
IN THE RAiLROAi) I.N¢usmY, 1938-40, pp. 47-51 (1947); Pollack, II'orkicn's Compcn-
sation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases, 36 COR.NE L.Q. 236, 241-2 (1951).
The injured worker who realizes that he is not legally barred from recovery where his
disregard of a personal safety rule contributed to his injury will enjoy an impruved bar-
gaining position.
26. See BETHEL, ATWATER, SmiTH & STACKIAN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIU, AND
MANAGEMENT 132-3 (1945).
27. See Tuttle v. Detroit, G.11 & M. Ry., 122 U.S. 1S9, 196 (1S7); Francis v.
Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 110 Mo. 387, 395, 19 S.W. 935, 936-7 (1892).
28. PRossER, TORTS § 53 (1941). Professor Lowndes contends that it is as logical
to argue that the doctrine of contributory negligence encourages care on the part of
potential plaintiffs as to argue that it encourages negligence on the part of potential
defendants. Lowndes, Contributory Neglqence, 22 GEo. L.J. 674, C81-2 (1934). See alS,
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE LJ.
549, 557-8 (1948).
29. "The adoption of the proposed amendment will, in cases in which no recovery
is now allowed, establish the principle of comparative negligence, which permits the jury
to weigh the fault of the injured employee and compare it with the negligence of the
employer, and, in the light of the comparison, do justice to all concerned." Sz,. REP,. No.
661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1939).
"[The 1939 amendment to the FELA] was clearly aimed at making the principles
of comparative negligence the guiding rules of decision in accident cases. .. ." Tiller v.
Atlantic C.L.R-R., 318 U.S. 54, 65 (1943). See also 42 CoNG. REc. 4434 (1903).
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